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We study the multifunctional character of agriculture in a model of endogenous input use and land 
allocation augmented by biodiversity, landscape amenity, and nutrient runoff. While biodiversity and 
landscape amenities represent the public good aspects of agriculture, nutrient runoff represents its negative 
externalities. We show that the private use of fertilizer input is higher and the size of buffer strips lower 
than the socially optimal solution requires. Also the socially optimal land allocation differs from the 
private solution due to the valuation of landscape diversity and runoff damages. The optimal policy is to 
use a differentiated fertilizer tax and a differentiated buffer strip subsidy and to determine their levels by 
the equality between the net value of their marginal product in food production and their effects on the 
marginal valuation of diversity and runoff damage in each parcel. We characterize empirically socially 
optimal multifunctional agriculture and the optimal design of the policy instruments by using Finnish data. 
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Multifunctional agriculture refers to the fact that agriculture produces jointly a number of food 
and non-food outputs, some of which exhibit the characteristics of externalities and public goods 
(OECD 2001). The primary source of this joint production is technical interdependence in the use 
of inputs and it is reinforced also by allocable fixed (or quasi-fixed) inputs, such as land 
(Shumway et al. 1984). In this paper we suggest an analytical framework for designing socially 
optimal multifunctional agriculture.  We use Lichtenberg’s model of agricultural production 
(1989), where the quality of lands varies and the land use patterns among crops are determined on 
the basis of relative rents. We augment this model by a description of landscape diversity, 
diversity of agro-ecosystems and nutrient runoff, which are linked to input and land allocation 
choices.  
 
The privately optimal use of inputs, and land allocation create a market solution for nutrient 
runoffs and, through the landscape mosaic, for ecosystem diversity as well. We compare the 
private solution to the socially optimal way of producing both food and non-food products. Then 
we investigate the optimal use of two instruments, namely, a fertilizer tax and a buffer strip 
subsidy, to guide the private solution towards social optimum. By a buffer strip we mean a 
boundary habitat that is a managed, uncultivated area covered by perennial vegetation between 
arable land and watercourses; and it serves for both environmental (to reduce water pollution 
from nutrient runoffs) and ecological (agro-ecosystem biodiversity) purposes. Finally, we 
illustrate in a numerical application how to determine the use of inputs and land allocation, which 
maximizes social welfare from multifunctional agriculture, and how to design policy instruments 
so as to achieve this optimum with decentralized decisions by farmers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formulate a model of agriculture 
with endogenous land allocation to different crops and study the properties of private agricultural 
production. Diversity valuation and runoff functions are developed in the beginning of section 3,   2
followed by the characterization of the socially optimal multifunctional production and by the 
optimal design of government instruments. In section 4 we provide a numerical application of our 
analytical model for policy design of multifunctional agriculture. A concluding section ends the 
paper. 
 
2.  The model of agricultural production 
 
Consider a representative farm, which has a fixed amount of arable land (G) available for 
agricultural production. The land quality depends on physical, chemical and biological factors, 
such as soil erosion, soil acidity (pH), and soil organic matter. Following Lichtenberg (1989) we 
assume that the variation in land quality can be ranked by a scalar measure q, with scale chosen 
so that minimal land quality is zero and maximal land quality is one, i.e.,  . Thus, G(q) is 
the cumulative distribution of q (acreage of having quality q at most), while g(q) is its density. 
For analytical convenience we further assume that g(q) is continuous and differentiable.  
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We assume that the farmer wishes to allocate his arable land to two cereal crops, crop 1 and crop 
2, and denote the shares of land devoted to them by   and  , defined as   
and  .  Production exhibits constant returns to land of any given 
quality but it is neoclassical with respect to inputs and land quality. Production of crops requires 
the use of fertilizer input l.  
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Next we introduce an additional type of land use problem into the model. We assume that the 
government pays a subsidy to the farmer for the arable land allocated to a buffer strip to be 
established between the field and waterways. Modeling this land allocation to buffer strips 
requires specific assumptions concerning the location and shape of the arable land in relation to 
the waterways. We assume that the land area is located by a waterway so that all parcels of 
different quality end in the shore. Thus, in order to get the buffer strip subsidy, the farmer has to 
establish a buffer strip on each of them (see Figure 1 below).  
 
2.1 Input use 
 
In the first and second stage the farmer takes the land allocation between the two crops as given 
and chooses the amount of fertilizer (l) applied on land of given quality q and crop i (first stage). 
Then farmer chooses the proportion of the land of quality q and crop i given fertilizer use on crop 
i to be allocated to a buffer strip (m) (second stage). Due to internal homogeneity of each parcel, 
production is linear in m. Finally, the production also depends positively on the land quality q so 
that agricultural productivity is greater at higher land qualities. Thus, the production per each 
parcel for both crops can be expressed as 
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This production function is assumed to be concave in both fertilizer and land quality, i.e.,   3
0 ; 0 < > ll l f f  and   (subscripts denote partial derivatives). 0 ; 0 < > qq q f f
1  
 
Next we develop the corresponding per parcel profit function. The farmer takes the prices of 
crops  pi and fertilizer c as given. The government intervenes in agriculture by levying two 
environmentally motivated instruments, a fertilizer tax, t, on the use of fertilizers, so that the 
after-tax price of fertilizer is  . We denote a subsidy on buffer strips by  , and 
assume that it is decreasing in m reflecting decreasing ability of buffer strips to further reduce 
runoff and increase species diversity. The following parameterization is used to solve 
comparative statics 
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. Moreover, we assume that the ability of buffer strips 
to prevent runoffs and promote biodiversity is independent of land quality. The farmer’s problem 
is to choose the inputs, l  and  , so as to maximize the profit per parcel
2: 
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The first-order conditions for the optimal solution are  
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and require that the value of the marginal product of input use equals their respective costs. 
Because the productivity of each parcel differs due to q, the optimal fertilizer intensity and the 
size of buffer strip differs in every parcel, as well (see Figure 1). The comparative statics of the 
model is condensed to  
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Hence, as regards to agri-environmental instruments we have 
 
Result 1. For internally homogenous parcels, a higher fertilizer tax decreases fertilizer intensity 
and increases the size of the buffer strips. A higher buffer strip subsidy increases the size of the 
buffer strips, but does not affect the fertilizer intensity.  
 
Result 1 is very intuitive. The own effects are conventional; tax decreases the profitability of 
fertilizer use and subsidy increases the marginal revenue from buffer strips. Cross-effects are 
asymmetrical, but intuitive. Fertilizer tax decreases the opportunity cost of buffer strips while 
higher subsidy for buffer strips does not change the marginal profitability of fertilizer application.  
 
2.2 Land allocation 
 
The next step is to determine the optimal land allocation between crop 1 and crop 2. Following 
Lichtenberg (1989) we assume that the lowest quality parcels suit better for crop 1, which is 
cultivated at lower fertilizer intensity than crop 2, so that it is optimal to allocate them for crop 1. 
The proportion of land of quality q allocated to crop 1 is denoted by  . The farmer  ) ( 1 q L
                                                           
1  To avoid complex notation we do not index parcels, but naturally equation [2] and other per parcel equations hold 
for every parcel.   
2 We adopt the following wording. The notion of ”fertilizer intensity” refers to l , while ”fertilizer used per parcel” 
refers to ( . 
i
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First-order condition for the optimal land allocation is  
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Hence, these first-order conditions lead to a corner solution for every homogenous parcel of 
given acreage with differential land quality. Thus, if   then all land of quality q 
is allocated for crop 1 (crop 2). Note, however, that in the case where 
 at higher quality parcels and   for all land of quality q, 
there is only one crossing point and each crop will be cultivated on a unique, compact range of 
land qualities. In what follows we assume that this holds. The comparative static effects of 
exogenous parameters on land allocation are 
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The effects of end prices and input costs on land allocation are familiar from Lichtenberg (1989). 
As regards to agri-environmental instruments we have 
 
Result 2.  Both instruments shift land into the production of less-fertilizer intensive crop, thus 
promoting the extensification of agriculture. 
 






Figure 1. The land allocation and optimal amount of buffer strip in each parcel.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates a specific spatial structure of the arable land, ordered from the lowest 
productivity parcel to the highest one. This structure is a function of the representative farmer’s 
decisions concerning land allocation and the use of inputs. It forms the landscape in our model.   5
2000).
3In Figure 1 the land quality improves from left to right and all parcels have a buffer strip. 
As the first-order conditions reveal, the optimal size of the buffer strip differs between parcels 
due to q (i.e. agricultural productivity). As the comparative statics revealed, the land allocation 
between crops and buffer strips depends on exogenous parameters, i.e. crop prices, fertilizer 
costs, and government instruments. Drawing on the comparative statics analysis, the vertical and 
horizontal arrows show that when the exogenous parameters change, they transform the 
landscape mosaic by inducing adjustments in the crop and buffer strip areas. Thus, besides 
market variables, also government instruments change the composition and configuration of this 
landscape mosaic (cf. Eiden et al. 
 
3.  Socially optimal multifunctional agriculture 
 
Assume next that society promotes multifunctional agriculture by regarding the aesthetic value of 
agricultural landscape, the diversity of agroecosystems and the surface water quality as the most 
important non-food outputs. Designing optimal multifunctional agriculture requires that we first 
define how landscape diversity, agricultural ecosystem diversity and nutrient runoffs are related 
to food production. 
 
3.1 Agricultural diversity and runoff functions 
 
The effects of agricultural production practices on surrounding ecosystems and species diversity 
can be assessed from an ecological angle. Kleijn (1997), Wossink et al. (1999), and Bäckman et al. 
(1999) show that in arable fields the largest number of species of both flora and fauna are found at 
the field edge/boundary. Since, they provide forage, shelter, and a reproduction and over-wintering 
site, as well as ecological corridors for wildlife, field edges belong to the most important semi-
natural habitats created and sustained by agriculture. Unlike the adjacent cultivated fields, field 
edges and buffer strips promote many flowering plants and thus the abundance of many insects 
such as butterflies and bees, which in turn are important for bird species. Moreover, they provide 
important habitats for pest predators, but also promote the abundance of weeds and insects (Swifth 
and Anderson 1993).  
 
Recently researchers have attempted to describe the agricultural landscape mosaic by using 
different indices, such as Shannon’s diversity index (see e.g. Eiden et al. 2000). These are 
indicators of the number and distribution of different patches in the landscape. Eiden et al. (2000) 
link these indices to landscape diversity, but they could be enlarged to cope with the overall 
diversity comprising both landscape diversity and biodiversity. We will use the aforementioned 
Shannon’s diversity index in our empirical analysis as a proxy for landscape diversity. For the 
analysis of the species diversity of agro-ecosystems, we adopt an approach of Ma et al. (2001) and 
provide estimates of floral species richness as a function of buffer strip area. 
 
In the theoretical analysis we apply a general description of people’s diversity valuation and link 
the choice of crops and the land allocation to landscape valuation. For brevity we call this 
landscape diversity valuation, even though it is more than that. Then we express the diversity of 
the agro-ecosystem as a function of the fertilizer input intensity and buffer strips. This part of the 
diversity we call agro-ecosystem diversity valuation. Hence, our description of the diversity 
valuation function is a product of “landscape diversity” and “agro-ecosystem diversity”. The 
                                                           
3 An alternative spatial description would be the case where land quality improves from the bottom of the field 
adjacent to the water body towards the upper part of the field. In this case buffer strip would be like any crop, say 
crop 0 with a fixed return and thus all parcels would be allocated among crop 0, crop 1 and crop 2. Consequently, the 
buffer strip would locate besides the stream, above it would be parcels allocated to crop 1, and then parcels allocated 
to crop 2 would be located at the top (see Appendix 1.C. for the mathematical solution).  
   6
multiplicative form of the diversity valuation function reflects the fact that the greater the 
landscape diversity the greater the level of ecosystem diversity, ceteris paribus, as [9] suggests  
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equation (1). The term   indicates the valuation of landscape diversity as a function of 
land allocation to different crops, and the latter term  ) , ( l m h   indicates the valuation of 
agroecosystem diversity as a function of input use. Via L1, L2, m and  l , the diversity valuation 
function also depends on land quality. We assume that increasing the acreage for each crop 
increases the landscape diversity in a diminishing way, i.e.,   and  , but  0 1 > k 0 2 > k 0 11 < k  and 
. For the use of fertilizer input, we assume that  0 22 < k 0 < l h  and  0 < l l h  to indicate that the 
higher the fertilizer use, the greater the loss in agro-ecosystem diversity. Finally, we assume that 
the width of the buffer strip increases ecosystem diversity by enlarging the field edge but with 
decreasing returns, i.e.,   and  0 > m h 0 < mm h  (this is confirmed e.g. by Ma et al. 2001). 
 
The runoff of nutrients (kg) from each parcel can be expressed as a function of fertilizer use   
and the size of the buffer strip 
i l
i m   as follows:  )) ( ), ( ( q m q l v z i i i i = ; for i = 1,2, where 
i i i l m l ) 1 ( − =  with  0 , 0 > > l l l v v  and  0 , 0 > < mm m v v . Thus, the runoff function is convex in the 
fertilizer application but concave in buffer strips. Hence, we can describe the total amount of the 
runoff from the land area devoted to crop 1 and crop 2 as 
 
[ ∫ − + = + =
1
0
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 ) ( ) 1 ))( ( ), ( ( )) ( ), ( ( dq q g L q m q l v L q m q l v z z z ]                      [10] 
 
3.2 Socially optimal provision of multifunctional agriculture: command optimum 
 
We turn next to the determination of the first-best solution for agricultural production as a 
command optimum in the absence of taxes and subsidies. By assumption the government 
maximizes the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus augmented with diversity valuation and 
damage function from nutrient runoff. The farmer’s profit function, and thus the producers’ 
surplus, has been defined earlier. We assume that the preferences of the representative consumer 
define an additively separable, quasi-linear utility function, U ) ( ) ( 2 1 Y u Y u I + + = , where I is 
exogenous money income. This utility function is concave in its arguments (crops) so that 
, but  . Moreover, the society values agro-ecosystem diversity,  0 ) ( > ′ i Y u 0 ) ( < ′ ′ i Y u
) ,l m ( ) , ( 2 1 h L L k
) (z d
, but derives disutility from the nutrient runoff. This runoff damage function, 
, is convex, i.e.  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ d  and  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ ′ d . Thus, the social welfare function can be expressed 
as 
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In order to see how the inclusion of diversity valuation and runoff damages changes the privately 
optimal solution characterized in equations [4a] and [4b], we solve the command optimum by 
assuming exogenous crop prices and, therefore, abstract for a moment from the consumer utility. 
Choosing (the second stage) the use of inputs for each parcel so as to maximize [11] produces the   7
following first-order conditions under exogenous crop prices: 
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According to [12a] in each parcel fertilizer is used up to the point where the value of its marginal 
product is equal to its unit price, adjusted by its marginal effects on runoffs and agro-ecosystem 
diversity.  The buffer strip size is optimal when the net loss of income due to decreased 
production is equal to the marginal benefits from runoff reduction and ecosystem diversity 
promotion [12b]. Note first that the choice of the buffer strip clearly differs across parcels making 
the fertilizer used per parcel to do so, too. Hence, we can immediately see that it will be socially 
optimal to use differentiated instruments. Recall next the private per parcel solution in equations 
[4a] and [4b], from which we can deduce the private solution in the absence of taxes and 
subsidies to be   and  . Thus the private solution 
neglects the effects on the production of public goods and nutrient runoff. While the use of 
fertilizer input is excessive, the use of buffer strips is too small from the viewpoint of society. In 
fact, in the absence of incentives provided by the society the privately optimal level of buffer 
strips is zero due to net loss of income. 
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The social planner maximizes [11] by allocating land to crops 1 and 2 and accounting for the 
effects of land allocation on diversity and nutrient runoffs. Recalling our assumptions from 
section 2.2, the social planner’s land allocation problem leads to a corner solution for every 
parcel, and a unique crossing point defined by 
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indicating that all land of quality q is allocated to the crop with highest social return. Comparing 
this with the privately optimal solution, where  , reveals the difference. In addition to 
maximum profits, the land allocation will depend on the marginal valuation of the landscape 
benefits and runoff damages. Note that even in the case where the private solution would be to 
grow only one crop, the social optimum may require the production of both crops if marginal 
valuation of landscape diversity caused by the other crop is high. 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 π π
  
Summing up, we have shown that 
 
Proposition 1. Socially optimal multifunctional agriculture promotes landscape diversity and 
agroecosystem diversity, as well as surface water protection by reducing the use of polluting 
fertilizer input, increasing the size of buffer strips and increasing the mosaic pattern of fields 
relative to privately optimal agricultural production. 
  
Naturally,  correcting  the  privately  optimal  use  of  inputs  and  land  allocation  to  reflect                     
socially optimal multifunctional agriculture requires an appropriate use of (differentiated) policy 
instruments. Now we turn to solving for the optimal tax and subsidy rates. 
 
3.3 Optimal level of chemical tax and buffer strip subsidy 
 
The choice of the socially optimal fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy rates requires that the 
government know how farmers react to the tax and the subsidy. This reaction is given by the   8
comparative statics of the use of inputs and land allocation in terms of the tax and the subsidy.  
 
As in the previous section, the government maximizes the sum of producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus from food production, augmented by the society’s valuation of diversity and nutrient 
runoff. This time, however, the producers’ surplus is defined by indirect profit functions in the 
presence of the fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy. Moreover, we assume that consumers are 
taxed by an income tax, the rate of which depends on the net-support to agriculture. Thus, 
consumers’ surplus is given by the consumer’s indirect utility function 
 where  ), ( ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 Y p u Y p u I U + + − =
∗ τ ) , (
− + = t λ τ τ  is the income tax rate as a function of 
net support to agriculture, and   is the demand for both crops (solved from the constrained 
utility maximization problem).  
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The government chooses the fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy for each parcel so as to 
maximize 
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Differentiating [14] for any parcel with respect to t and λ, treating crop prices as exogenous and 
accounting for the fact that only direct effects matter for the farmers’ profit function due to the 
envelope theorem (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995), we get the following first-order 
conditions for the differentiated optimal fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy 
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The optimal fertilizer tax rate for each parcel is found by equating the direct economic loss of the 
farmer to the marginal benefits from runoff reduction and improvement in diversity, as well as 
lower income taxation of consumers. Looking more closely at the tax effects on diversity, we can 
see that while the agroecosystem diversity improves, landscape diversity may decrease depending 
on its marginal valuation. Nevertheless, for the expression [15a] to be zero at the interior solution, 
the sum of the changes in the marginal valuation of runoff damages and diversity must be 
positive. The optimal buffer strip subsidy for each parcel is set so as to equalize the disutility 
from higher income taxation to the sum of direct economic gain to the farmer and the marginal 
benefit from runoff reduction and diversity. While the runoff unambiguously decreases, the effect 
on the diversity is ambiguous, because the landscape diversity may or may not improve. These 
optimality conditions illustrate well the complexity of designing multifunctional agriculture. 
Because now both input intensity and land allocation are endogenous, their changes may easily 
go in opposite directions, as shown in both conditions. Moreover, consumer must be willing to 
pay for multifunctionality.   9
 
To collect, we have 
 
Proposition 2.  Promotion of multifunctional agriculture when it depends on land quality, 
requires differentiated instruments:  
i) a fertilizer tax set at a level which equates the direct economic loss of the farmer to the 
marginal benefits from runoff reduction and improvement in diversity, as well as utility from 
lower income taxation,  
ii) a buffer strip subsidy set at a level which equates the disutility from higher income taxation to 
the sum of direct economic gain to the farmer and the marginal changes in runoff and diversity. 
 
Using differentiated instruments is difficult in practice. Hence, reducing the number of 
instruments is the option of the second best policy. 
 
4. Numerical application of the analytical model 
 
In this section we illustrate our approach to multifunctional agriculture in a parametric 
application of our analytical model. By using Finnish data we determine the basic features of 
socially optimal multifunctional agriculture and design optimal fertilizer tax (nitrogen tax) and 
buffer strip subsidy rates that can sustain this optimality. We first solve numerically both the 
private optimum in the absence of instruments as well as the command optimum. The latter 
allows us to define the rates of differentiated fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy for each parcel 
so as to maximize the target function in equation [14]. We also apply uniform fertilizer tax and 
buffer strip subsidy for each crop as a second-best solution. Finally, we compare the privately 
optimal solution in the absence of taxes and subsidies and under second-best instruments with the 
command optimum. Comparisons are made in terms of input-use, short-run profits, runoffs and 
diversity, for which we offer two measures, floral species richness (species diversity of 
agroecosystem) and Shannon’s diversity index (landscape diversity), and finally in terms of 
social welfare under alternative solutions. 
 
4.1 Parametric model 
 
Following the analytical model we start with the farmer and the production function in equation 
[2]. In the parametric model we apply a quadratic nitrogen response function (with parameters 
estimated for barley (crop 1) and wheat (crop 2) in clay soils by Bäckman et al. 1997) 
 
2
i i i i i i l l a y β α + + =    for  i = 1,2                       [16] 
 
where yi = yield response in kg/ha, ai  = intercept parameter, li = nitrogen fertilizer applied in 
kg/ha, αi,βi = parameters, αi > 0, βi < 0. 
 
Land quality q is continuous and incorporated in equation (16) via the intercept parameter ai, 
which is assumed to increase linearly: 
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                          [17] 
 
where e0 and n0 are the lowest levels of natural productivity, e1 and n1 are the slopes of the 
productivity change and q is the number of hectares. The assumption of linearly improving 
quality is, of course, the simplest way of introducing heterogeneity of land quality.    10
 
The representative farmer’s short-run profits, parametric version of [3], per parcel for crop i in 
the presence of a fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy are given by 
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where λ is the maximum level of buffer strip subsidy and ai is defined by [17]. Thus, we assume 
that the (quadratic) buffer strip subsidy is decreasing in the size of the buffer strip. This reflects 
the fact that the buffer strips have a decreasing ability to further decrease nutrient runoff and to 
increase species diversity. 
 
Next we develop a parametric description for the environmental parts of the social welfare 
function, namely runoff damage and agroecosystem valuation. We use the following nitrogen 
leakage function (Simmelsgaard 1991) ) exp( ) ( 0 i n i bN b y N y + = for  i = 1,2. where y (Ni) = 
nitrogen leakage at fertilizer intensity level Ni, kg/ha, yn = nitrogen leakage at average nitrogen 
use, b0 = a constant (<0), b = a parameter (>0), and Ni = relative nitrogen fertilization in relation 
to normal fertilizer intensity for the crop, 0.5 ≤  N  ≤ 1.5. We, however, modify the leakage 
function to incorporate the reductive effect of the buffer strip on the nitrogen runoff Zi to be 
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where Zi = nitrogen runoff, y(Ni) = nitrogen leakage at fertilizer intensity level Ni, kg/ha, j = share 
of the surface runoff of combined surface and drainage runoff, and r = nitrogen removal 
effectiveness of the buffer strip. 
 
Based on Finnish experimental studies on grass buffer strips (Uusi-Kämppä and Yläranta 1992, 
1996) and on the leaching of nitrogen (Turtola and Jaakkola 1987, Turtola and Puustinen 1998), 
we make the following assumptions. Of the total nitrogen load 50% is surface runoff. A 10-
meter-wide grass buffer strip is able to reduce 50% of the total nitrogen of this surface runoff. 
Moreover, since in Finnish experimental studies combined surface and drainage nitrogen 
leakages (yn) at the fertilization level of 100 kg N/ha have been in the order of 10-20 kg N/ha, the 
parameter yn is set at the value of 15. We are obligated to use Finnish parameters in a Danish 
leakage function, because no estimations for a Finnish leakage function are available despite the 
leaching experiments in Finland. However, the Danish leakage function was estimated for sandy 
and clay soils cultivated by barley and wheat, and the Finnish leaching experiments also took 
place on clay soils cultivated by barley and wheat. Thus, data from these two sources can be 
reasonably combined. 
 
For the social value of runoff damages we use an estimate provided by Vehkasalo (1999). He 
approximated the social benefits of reducing nitrogen runoffs from Finnish agriculture by 
applying the averting expenditure valuation method, and estimated the costs of a corresponding 
nitrogen reduction at municipal wastewater treatment facilities. The cost estimate is FIM 9.5 per 
reduced kg of nitrogen (when 10 to 20 per cent of the total nitrogen load is reduced). We assume 
a convex damage function from runoffs, i.e. d z z z ) 024 , 0 5 , 9 ( ) ( + = .  
 
Our estimate for agroecosystem diversity valuation function is given in buffer strip hectares. By 
using the contingent valuation method, Aakkula (1999) provides an estimate for the economic 
value of pro-environmental farming in Finland (pro-environmental farming was defined as an 
economic activity that enhances environmental and ecological quality of the rural environment).   11
He found that the average WTP/ha for pro-environmental farming was FIM 466.
4 However, 
besides landscape diversity and the diversity of agro-ecosystems, this estimate also includes the 
value of nutrient runoff reduction. Therefore, we use the estimate of FIM 326 per hectare, which 
is 30% lower than Aakkula’s average WTP.
5 Therefore, we will use the following concave 
valuation function for agroecosystem diversity, i.e.  i i m m ) 70 340 ( − = µ . Thus, the runoff damage 
and biodiversity valuation parts in the parametric model can be expressed as follows 
i i i i m m z z ) 70 340 ( ) 024 , 0 5 , 9 ( − + + for i = 1,2 where  ) ( ) 1 ( i i i N y m z − = , and y(Ni) is defined in 
[19]. 
 
We link agroecosystem diversity valuation function to species diversity with the help of a study 
by Ma et al. (2001), which focuses on the relationship between floral species richness and buffer 
strip area using Finnish data. Ma et al. take as their starting point the conventional species-area 
relationship,  , where S is species richness, A is area, ψ is the number of species in the 
initial area, and ϕ describes the rate of species increase along with the increase of area. Then Ma 
et al. modify this relationship to include the length (L) and the width (W) of the buffer strip area 
as follows  , where 
ϕ ψA S =
α ϕ ψ W L =
β ϕ S α ϕ ( B ϕ ) is an estimate for the average change in species richness 
due to an increase in the length (width) of the area while keeping the width (length) of the area 
constant. Hence, after having solved for m, we can assess the floral species richness by using the 
following coefficients estimated by Ma et al. (2001):  6331 . 1 = ψ ,  0009 . 0 = α ϕ ,  0977 . 0 = β ϕ . 
 
Finally, we apply ex post the Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI) as a measure of landscape 
diversity (see Eiden et al. 2000). The Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI) is calculated by adding for 
each patch type in a reference area the proportion of area covered by that patch type multiplied by 







i i P P SHDI
1
) ln * (   f o r     i = 1,2,3,4                      [20] 
 
where n = number of patch types and Pi = the proportion of the area covered by patch type i out 
of the four patches in our model. The SHDI is a combination of the richness (number of different 
patch types) and evenness (proportional area distribution among patch types) of the landscape 
diversity.  
 
Other parameter values for our parametric model are reported in Table 1. The arable land area is 
assumed to be 60 hectares. The calculation of the Shannon’s diversity index requires assumptions 
concerning the specific shape of the field. We assume that the height of the field is 500 m and the 
length is 1200 m. The base case of our parametric model represents the private market solution 
(without taxes and subsidies) for cereals in Finland in 1999.  
                                                           
4 More precisely, Aakkula used the contingent valuation method to elicit a monetary value for the conversion from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
5 This 30% reduction closely corresponds to Vehkasalo’s runoff damage estimate FIM 147,9 at the average runoff 
level of 15 kg N/ha.   12
 
Table 1. Parameters of numerical application 
 
Parameter Symbol  Value 
price of barley  p1 FIM  0.73/kg 
price of wheat  p2 FIM  0.83/kg 
price of nitrogen fertilizer  c  FIM 5.95/kg 
parameter of quadratic nitrogen response 
function 
α  52.9 for barley 
35.8 for wheat 
parameter of quadratic nitrogen response 
function 
β  -0.173 for barley 
-0.094 for wheat 






Initial level of productivity for crop 1 
Initial level of productivity for crop 2 
Slope of the productivity change for crop 1 










Share of surface runoff from combined runoff 
Nitrogen removal effectiveness of buffer strip 
j 
r 
0.5 (i.e. 50%) 
0.5 (i.e. 50%) 
nitrogen leakage at average nitrogen use  yn 10-20  kg/ha 
parameter of leakage function 






Notes: Prices are from the year 1999. The price of nitrogen is calculated on the basis of a compound NPK 
fertilizer.  
Sources: Bäckman et al. 1997, Turtola and Jaakkola 1987, Simmelsgaard 1991. 
 
4.2 Results  
 
We solve first solutions for private optimum in the absence of intervention and for the socially 
optimal multifunctional agriculture. Some results are highlighted in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
represents the average solutions for the use of inputs under alternative solutions.
7 Expectedly, the 
use of fertilizer in each parcel is smaller under the social optimum than in the private solution. 
This holds true even more for buffer strips, for which the private solution provides a zero size. 
 
Table 2. Average input use per hectare under alternative solutions 
  Crop 1  Crop 2 
  fertilizer, kg  buffer strip, ha  fertilizer, kg  buffer strip, ha 
Private  optimum  129,3 0,00 152,3 0,00 
Social  optimum  121,4 0,016 139,2 0,014 
Second-best 
instruments 
106,6 0,136 123,5 0,125 
 
As an example of second best policy, we have solved the optimal quadruple for the last parcel (in 
order to have an interior solution for buffer strips also in the highest quality parcels), which in our 
case is the 60
th hectare, to yield crop-specific instruments that are uniform with respect to parcels 
and thus land quality. Solving the optimal level of instruments for the last parcel with highest 
productivity/land quality means that the marginal revenue of buffer strips is high at lower quality 
parcels. The optimal level of the instruments for the last parcel are defined as follows: fertilizer 
tax for crop 1 is 25% and 29% for crop 2. Buffer strip subsidy is FIM 2987 for crop 1 and FIM 
                                                           
6  The estimated, average constant for these crops are a1 = 1010 for barley and a2 = 1274 for wheat (Bäckman et al. 
1997). 
7 The quality is continuous in the parametric model, but we use hectare as our basic unit when reporting the results.   13
3387 for crop 2. As can be seen from Table 2 these second-best instruments are over optimal, 
since they result on average much wider buffer strips (and less fertilizer use) than is required 
from social point of view.  
 
The first two rows in Table 3 condense the economic and environmental features of the private 
market solution and command optimum. We report land allocation, short-run profits, nitrogen 
runoffs, floral species richness, Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI), and the social welfare (SW), 
which is calculated as a sum of profits, runoff damage and diversity benefits.  
 
Table 3. Results 
 
Policy  Land allocation, ha 











20          
40 










156 442  763  97  1,01  133 696 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, the private market solution in the absence of taxes and subsidies yields highest 
private profits, but also the highest runoffs and the lowest value for SHDI, resulting in the lowest 
value for social welfare. In the absence of buffer strip subsidy the optimal level of buffer strips is 
zero, and thus the estimate of floral species richness in buffer strip areas is zero as well in this 
case. The command optimum produces lower private profits because of the internalization of 
negative and positive externalities associated with runoffs and agro-ecosystem diversity. In the 
command optimum SHDI increases mainly due to the increased number of patch types via the 
emergence of buffer strip areas. The buffer strip areas in this solution (0,9 ha in total) provide 76 
floral species. 
 
How does the optimal multifunctional policy look like? As theoretical model predicts, the first-
best policy consists of 60 pairs of fertilizer tax and buffers strip subsidy, that is, they are crop and 
parcel specific instruments. They are solved from the command optimum solution to reflect the 
size of positive and negative externalities per parcel.  
 
In the case of second-best instruments, the net-support (i.e. subsidy minus tax) is taken into 
account, so that the welfare calculations between alternative solutions are comparable. We report 
the private solution under the second best instruments in the third row of Table 3. Now the 
private profits are lower than under command optimum. Nitrogen runoffs are clearly lower due to 
increase in buffer strip areas (total buffer strip area in this case is 7,7 ha). SHDI and floral species 
number increase also clearly compared to command optimum owing to a higher share of buffer 
strip areas. Moreover, more equitable area distribution between different patch types increases 
SHDI in this case compared to command optimum. Hence, this solution is very strong from 
environment point of view, but results in lower social welfare than command optimum. Thus, 
FIM 1572 (FIM 26,2 per hectare) difference in social welfare compared to that of command 




We developed a theoretical framework for analyzing the multifunctional agriculture as the joint 
production of a number of food and non-food products. The core of our framework was   14
Lichtenberg’s model of agricultural production with endogenous input and land allocation choice 
for two alternative crops, augmented by a description of non-food aspects of agriculture. From 
among these non-food outputs we focused on diversity of agro-ecosystems and landscape 
diversity, as well as on nutrient runoffs. We defined the diversity valuation function of agriculture 
as a multiplicative product of landscape diversity valuation and agro-ecosystem diversity 
valuation. Both were expressed as a function of agricultural input choices and land allocation to 
alternative crops. Our nutrient runoff function followed conventional lines in agricultural 
economics. 
 
We solved for the privately optimal land allocation and the choice of inputs, and compared this 
with the corresponding social optimum. The private optimum includes a higher fertilizer use and 
a smaller size of the buffer strips than those in the socially optimal solution. The socially optimal 
land allocation between crops 1 and 2 requires that the effects of land allocation on diversity and 
nutrient runoff is taken into account. How much social optimum differs from privately optimal 
solution depends on the relative valuation of landscape diversity vis-à-vis runoff damage. 
 
As for the alternative means of achieving an optimal multifunctional agriculture, we studied the 
choice of fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy rates. The optimal differentiated tax rate for each 
parcel is chosen so as to offset the negative welfare effect of tax on farmers with the positive 
effect on consumer welfare in terms of lower income taxation and positive marginal valuation 
effect as a sum of diversity and runoff functions. The optimal buffer strip subsidy per parcel, in 
turn, increases directly farmers’ profits and decreases consumers’ surplus and this is 
counterbalanced by the changes in the marginal valuation of nutrient runoff and diversity. 
 
In the numerical application of our analytical model we solved the private and command 
optimum in the absence of taxes and subsidies and demonstrated that private solution leads to 
excessive use of fertilizer, sub-optimal use of buffer strips and excessive land devoted for the 
production of crop 2. We then solved for the optimal first-best tax and subsidy levels yielding 60 
pairs of crop and parcel specific fertilizer taxes and buffer strip subsidies. We also solved for 
second-best policy instruments and studied the social welfare loss and other properties of this 
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